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Brexit and Devolution:  
New Frontiers for the UK Union 
Stephen Clear1 
I.  Introduction 
s the UK prepares to leave the EU, 2  much has been said about the 
consequences for open borders and EU freedoms.3 After nearly five decades 
of membership,4 the complexities surrounding divorcing UK laws from those 
intertwined with the EU are, unsurprisingly, fraught with difficulties. 
However, beyond Brexit, it is often taken for granted that the UK has enjoyed a 
‘customs union’, and border-free movement, that has endured far beyond the longevity 
of the EU, insofar as the UK is a nation-of-nations.5 Whilst, post-1998, the UK’s 
unitary constitutional model of devolution has been fragmented and incremental,6 the 
transfer of powers to the regions has been largely based on mutual respect. 
Brexit has seen these relationships enter new territory, not least over motions 
passed by the devolved parliaments under the Sewel Convention, otherwise known as 
Legislative Consent Motions (“LCM”s). Operating on a convention basis, such 
motions are based on the political principle that the UK legislature will not normally 
pass laws that either directly affect a devolved subject matter; or change the 
competence, or powers, of a devolved legislature or its ministers, without consent to 
do so. Although the Supreme Court has stated that the devolved legislatures have no 
legal right of veto over Brexit,7 the UK Government, at least at the time, acknowledged 
that LCMs should be sought from the devolved bodies;8 particularly, as Brexit would 
change areas traditionally of devolved competence.9 However, following refusals by 
Scotland and some Welsh Assembly Members to grant LCMs, there are now greater 
political points of contention between the regions and Westminster. In the absence of 
a political solution, the UK Government has had to shift towards an arbitrary reliance 
                                                   
1 Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, Bangor Law School, Bangor University, 
Wales.  
2 Following the referendum facilitated by the European Union Referendum Act 2015.  
3 See: Michael Dougan (ed), The UK After Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia, 2017). 
4 Following the European Union Communities Act 1972 ss.2(1)-(4).  
5 Act of Union with Scotland 1707, and Act of Union with Ireland 1800. 
6 Robert Hazell (ed), ‘Devolution and the Future of the Union’ (Constitution Unit April 2015) 
<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/tabs/unit-
publications/163.pdf/>accessed 30 October 2018; and Aled Griffiths, Stephen Clear and Huw 
Pritchard, ‘Fragmented and Incremental Devolution in the United Kingdom’ (2015) 3 JCLC 74 
(India).  
7 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
8  UK Parliament, ‘Territorial Extent and Application’ (Parliament.uk 13 July 2017) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-
2019/0005/en/18005en11.htm>accessed 30 October 2018. 
9 EU Withdrawal Bill clause 15, formerly 11.  
A 
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on Westminster’s supremacy. In doing so, socio-political evidence advanced by the 
regions’ political parties shows that the rhetoric is changing, with greater and more 
frequent references to how disregard for their concerns will lead to renewed calls for 
independence.  
Whilst it is appropriate, within a democracy that follows the tenets of the rule 
of law, to debate where powers should be vested following Brexit, the strain on the 
UK’s unitary constitutional model needs to be addressed. Scholarship has focused on 
the UK constitution after Miller,10 but recent signals from politicians suggest that the 
time is now opportune to also reconsider constitutional patriarchy, the model of 
Westminster sovereignty, and their effect on the UK Union.  Given the concerns of 
Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish politicians, and the societies they represent, for the 
UK Union to survive, asymmetrical quasi-federalism is looking increasingly likely 
post-Brexit. 
II. New Frontiers for Devolution 
The UK’s constitution has been predominantly recognised as political in nature,11 with 
the caveat being that what is legally possible may not be practically achievable.12 
Within the context of devolution, the legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament, and Welsh 
and Northern Irish Assemblies is facilitated via the respective devolution Acts passed 
by Westminster.13 Nonetheless, it is through this recognition of the difference between 
the theoretical legal possibilities (i.e. that the UK Parliament could shut down the regions’ 
legislatures), compared to the political reality of the situation (that doing so would cause 
turmoil), that Westminster has sought to maintain a working relationship with the 
devolved administrations. For example, whilst the Scottish Government wanted to 
pursue an independence referendum, it did not have the legal competence to do so (as 
matters pertaining to the UK Union are legally reserved).14 It was through respect for 
the will of the Scottish people that the UK Government agreed that the Referendum 
Act could be an exception to the Scottish devolution scheme.15  
This relationship of mutual political respect has been recognised via LCMs. 
Whilst such conventions exist politically (and have been recognised within devolution 
legislation),16 the agreements are not legally binding. Nor do they limit the sovereign 
powers of the UK Parliament. Nevertheless, it is rare for the devolved legislatures to 
refuse Westminster’s LCMs, with the Welsh Assembly only refusing such on seven 
                                                   
10 Mark Elliot and others (eds) The UK Constitution after Miller (Hart Publishing, 2018). 
11 John AG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ [1979] 42 MLR 1.  
12 Mark Elliot and others (n10), Ch 2.  
13 Scotland Act 1998 (SA1998), Northern Ireland Act 1998, and the Government of Wales Act 
1998/2006; which are all subject to parliamentary sovereignty rules.  
14 SA 1998 (n13), sch.5.  
15 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013.  
16 See SA1998 (n13), s.28, as amended by Scotland Act 2016 s.2; and Government of Wales Act 
2006 s.108, as amended by Wales Act 2017 s.3. For commentary: TH Jones, ‘Wales, Devolution 
and Sovereignty’ (2012) 33 Stat.L.R 151. 
Journal of the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies | Issue 2, 2018 
 
40 
 
occasions since 2011,17 and the Scottish Parliament only doing so on one occasion 
other than Brexit.18 In all previous instances, the result of a region refusing a LCM has 
been a political compromise between the UK Government and the devolved executives 
to revise either the Bill itself, or policy or practice. 
However, in an unprecedented exercise of constitutional power, the paradigm 
of mutual respect for the regions has been destabilised in the context of Brexit. When 
the UK Government sought LCMs from the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly 
for the EU Withdrawal Bill, they did so against the backdrop of Scotland officially 
voting remain, and the First Minister claiming that a second independence vote was 
highly likely. Similarly, Wales, whilst officially voting to leave, still had a 47.5% 
remain vote (1% more than in England). 19  The primary point of contention over 
granting LCMs was the ‘devolution insensitive’ clause 15 (formerly 11), 20  which 
enables Westminster to temporarily retain power over some devolved areas, which 
have traditionally been subject to EU oversight. The UK Government is of the opinion 
that temporary control is needed in order to ensure regulatory alignment across the 
whole of the UK, so as to not become a future barrier to international trade via 
divergence across the regions. Although the Welsh Assembly voted to pass their LCM, 
some Assembly Members have remained strongly opposed to the Bill, referring to it as 
a loss of leadership and a farcical weakening of the Welsh Parliament.21 By contrast, 
the Scottish Parliament have refused their LCM, stating that they could not give 
consent to something that limits the will of the Scottish people, nor limits the powers 
of their Parliament.22 Instead the Scottish Parliament has attempted to implement its 
own Continuity Bill, which, whilst set to be challenged in the Supreme Court, proposes 
that Brexit will not affect any existing, legally recognised, Scottish powers.23  
                                                   
17 Welsh Assembly, ‘Legislative Consent Motions’ (2018)<http://www.assembly.wales/en/bus-
home/research/bus-assembly-publications-monitoring-services/bus-lcm_monitor/Pages/bus-
lcm_monitor.aspx>accessed 30 October 2018. 
18 In relation to the Welfare Reform Act 2012, with the LCM refusal culminating in Scottish 
Ministers being given competency in administering universal credit and personal independence 
payment benefits.  
19 The Electoral Commission, ‘EU Referendum Results’ 
(2018)<https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-
referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-
information>accessed 30 October 2018. 
20  Commons Select Committee, ‘Constitutionally Insensitive Clause 11’ (Parliament.UK, 29 
November 2017) 
<https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-
administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/devolution-clause-11-
report-published-17-19/>accessed 30 October 2018.  
21 BBC News, ‘Brexit Bill Deal a Significant Achievement’ (25 April 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-43895350> accessed 30 October 2018. 
22  BBC News, ‘Holyrood Refuses Consent for Westminster Brexit Bill’ (15 May 2018) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-44113864> accessed 30 October 
2018. 
23 Scottish Parliament, ‘Legal Continuity (Scotland) Bill’ (2018) 
<http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/107725.aspx> accessed 30 October 
2018. 
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This recent sequence of events has seen the UK Government depart from its 
traditional approach to LCMs and, given the result of the EU referendum, the 
traditional approach of negotiating a political solution to Scotland’s rejection appears 
impossible. Whilst refusal to grant a LCM will not legally prevent the passage of the 
EU Withdrawal Bill, nor stop Brexit, this reliance by Westminster on the legal 
possibility over and above the political reality of the situation represents a new frontier 
in devolution history.  
The notion of sovereignty, including where power is held, and by whom, has 
been much debated in recent years. 24   However, politically speaking the EU 
Referendum never asked the question as to where power should be vested once 
returned from Brussels. One might question whether, given the strong national 
identities in both regions, Welsh and Scottish citizens who voted in favour of Brexit 
would also have voted for such powers to be concentrated in London over and above 
Cardiff and Edinburgh. As can be seen in the discussions below, such disunity is now 
being capitalised upon by the nationalist parties and devolved administrations to reflect 
upon the inequalities amongst the different nations within the UK. 
III.  New Paradigms in the Regions’ Responses 
As a result of these events, the devolved administrations have raised concerns that the 
UK Government cannot be trusted to respect the devolution settlements, and that 
Brexit processes are arbitrarily ‘rolling back’ responsibilities that have long been 
devolved.25 Such warnings have also been reflected in the House of Lords, where Lord 
McNally ironically stated “it is the Conservative and Unionist Party that is overseeing 
the greatest threat to this Union.”26 Furthermore, concerns about the mutual respect 
and relationships between Westminster and the regions have been exacerbated by 
studies suggesting, for example, that 59.9% of voters in the UK prioritise Brexit over 
the UK Union.27  However, perhaps the starkest warnings are coming from the regions 
themselves.  
Hours after the EU referendum result, the SNP were calling for a second 
independence referendum. 28  Similarly Scotland’s First Minister claimed that 
                                                   
24  For commentary: M Gordon, ‘The UK’s Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and 
Beyond…’ (2016) 27 K.L.J. 333. For sovereignty within context of devolution: for Scotland: Lord 
Hope in Axa General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, para 46, and Lord Reed, para 
145. For Wales: Re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3. 
25  Mark Drakeford, ‘Brexit not a vote to roll back devolution’ (BBC News, 11 March 
2018)<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-43362420> accessed 30 October 2018. 
26 House of Lords Hansard, ‘Scotland: European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Volume 791’ (14 June 
2018)<https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2018-06-14/debates/8A0EE9B9-5132-4BF5-BB80-
ACFD3CFB6407/ScotlandEuropeanUnion(Withdrawal)Bill> accessed 30 October 2018. 
27 Hatty Collier, ‘Brexit is more important to voters than keeping the UK together’ (Business Insider 
UK, 18 March 2017)<http://uk.businessinsider.com/poll-brexit-is-more-important-to-voters-than-
keeping-the-uk-togerther-2017-3> accessed 30 October 2018. 
28 Kevin McKenna, ‘Scottish Nationalists Are Already Salivating Over the Spoils of Brexit’ (The 
Guardian, 18 February 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/18/scottish-nationalists-salivating-
over-brexit-spoils> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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Westminster has consistently attempted to ‘grab power back’ over Brexit, which will 
not be forgotten in the next independence bid.29  SNP disdain over Brexit can be 
reflected in the guerrilla tactics the party has recently used to disrupt proceedings 
within the House of Commons, such as walking out during Prime Minister’s 
Questions.30  
Within Westminster, similar statements have been made by Plaid Cymru 
setting out the Welsh position:  
“It is impossible to overstate the seismic implications of Brexit for Wales…We are 
facing…a vortex of centralisation, a self-affirmation of self-interest in sovereignty 
by and for Westminster…[M]y party argued in favour of remain…because we 
believed…small nations like Wales are served better sitting alongside the 
other…small nations of Europe…as equals. We argued that the inbuilt inequality 
of the UK would make Wales expendable political collateral to the overriding 
interests of England…Brexit will be a landmark in the journey Wales takes to our 
own conclusion…Westminster and its parties will always treat Wales like an 
adjunct, an afterthought, an inconvenience….All that does is make the case for 
Welsh political independence.”31 
Whilst Northern Ireland does not currently have an active Parliament at 
Stormont (following the collapse of the power-sharing agreement),32 Sinn Féin have 
similarly called for an independence referendum, claiming that the reunification of 
Ireland is now needed as ‘Brexit exposes (the) undemocratic nature of partition.’33 
Some may be inclined to dismiss these statements by nationalists as biased, but 
the cumulative traction of the calls for independence, by all regions, equates to one of 
the most decisive periods for the UK’s future. Whilst the Prime Minister has refused 
to allow independence referendums during Brexit negotiations, 34 this uncharted move 
away from seeking political compromise will indubitably lead to future consequences 
for the UK Union.   
                                                   
29 Stewart Ward, ‘First Minister says Scotland ‘Won’t Forget’ Today’ (The National, 12 June 2018) 
<http://www.thenational.scot/news/16286036.First_Minister_says_Scotland__won_t_forget__t
oday_as_power_grab_vote_passes/> accessed 30 October 2018. 
30 Anne Perkins, ‘SNP promise more guerrilla tactics over Brexit powers’ (The Guardian, 14 June 
2018)<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/14/snp-promises-more-guerrilla-tactics-
over-brexit-powers> accessed 30 October 2018. 
31 Liz Saville Roberts, ‘Sewel Convention Volume 643’ (House of Commons Hansard 18 June 
2018), available online:<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-06-
18/debates/1D1AC068-4583-41A9-978E-2678E2EB9901/SewelConvention#contribution-
696153D2-6E75-4D8A-A6D0-ACF7B6AEF9A1> accessed 30 October 2018. 
32  BBC News, ‘Power-sharing talks collapse at Stormont’ (BBC, 14 February 
2018)<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-43064009> accessed 30 
October 2018. 
33 Michelle O’Neill, ‘Sinn Féin urges unity referendum within five years’ (Irish Times, 1 April 
2018)<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/sinn-f%C3%A9in-urges-unity-referendum-
within-five-years-1.3447391> accessed 30 October 2018. 
34 Heather Stewart and others, ‘Theresa May rejects Nicola Sturgeon’s referendum demand’ (The 
Guardian, 16 March 2017)<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/16/theresa-may-
rejects-nicola-sturgeons-scottish-referendum-demand> accessed 30 October 2018. 
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Whilst those consequences are yet to be realised, perhaps a more measured 
view of what could happen comes from the current Welsh First Minister:  
“There will need to be change…[T]he UK’s constitution has come to the end of its 
ability to deal with devolution…It’s…a question of putting in place a constitution 
where it is understood what the different levels of government do. Does that mean 
an end of parliamentary sovereignty? Well I’m afraid it does.”35 
The Welsh First Minister was discussing federalism prior to the EU referendum 
result, but the divisiveness of Brexit, and the concerns raised by the regions over 
perceived ‘London-centric power grabs’, strengthens such proposals for revising 
devolution settlements within the UK. 
IV.  Concluding Thoughts 
Legally, independence from the UK Union cannot be sought without Westminster 
approval. The UK’s unitary constitutional model, and the devolution Acts, make it 
clear that such matters are reserved for London alone. Furthermore, the Prime 
Minister has made it explicit  that none of the devolved administrations will be granted 
an independence referendum until after the Brexit negotiations have concluded.  
Nonetheless, Brexit has led to new strains on UK devolution relationships. 
Politically, if there is a will amongst the region’s societies to pursue independence it 
would be difficult for Westminster to morally enforce its supremacy. Whilst the UK 
Government has now departed from its traditional paradigms over LCMs, the 
consequences of trying to exert legal sovereignty via constitutional patriarchy, rather 
than pursue political compromise with Scotland, appears to be serving the ambitions 
of nationalist political parties in their pursuit of independence.  
For the UK Union to survive, asymmetrical quasi-federalism is looking increasingly 
likely. 36  The post-Brexit challenge for the UK Government will be the territorial 
distribution of power amongst the devolved regimes, particularly in light of the new 
powers that will return from Brussels. The need to consider a basic territorial duality 
of the Whitehall machine is now needed if the UK Union is to endure and prosper 
post-Brexit. 37  As a minimum, owing to the views of the regions’ societies, the UK 
may inevitably have to move towards an even looser State of Union, particularly as 
demands to rework traditional London-centred conceptions of the executive grow. 
                                                   
35 Mark Elliot, ‘Why Carwyn thinks we’re moving towards federalism’ (IWA, 23 January 
2014)<http://www.iwa.wales/click/2014/01/why-carwyn-thinks-were-moving-towards-
federalism/> accessed 30 October 2018. 
36 See further: Akash Paun and others, ‘Governing after the Referendum’ (Institute for 
Government, 
2014)<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Scenarios%2
0paper%20-%20final%20APJR.pdf> accessed 30 October 2018. 
37 For expanded view: Rick Rawlings, ‘A Coalition Government in Westminster’ in Jeffrey Jowell 
and others, The Changing Constitution (8th edn OUP 2015) Ch.7.  
